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1 According to a basic dualistic conception that 
originated in Descartes, minds are immaterial, non-spatial 
and simple thinking particulars that are independent of 
anything material. Call this view the Cartesian conception, 
and minds thus conceived, Cartesian minds. In what 
follows I propose a new version of an argument against the 
Cartesian conception that can be traced back to 
Descartes’ days (Garber and Ayers 1998, 232). The 
inspiration behind my version is an argument suggested by 
Strawson’s seminal discussion of the concept of a person 
(1959, Chaps. 3-4). However, in both form and substance 
my argument takes its own course. 
 
2 Simplicity in the sense assumed by the 
Cartesian conception means absolute indivisibility. As 
Leibniz insisted simplicity in this sense is compatible with 
complexity of internal structure (Rutherford 1995, 159): A 
complex whole may be such that it cannot exist except in 
its entirety. Indeed, on the Cartesian conception the 
properties of minds relate to them as constituents relate to 
wholes, and here is my starting point.  
Properties of concrete particulars are respects in 
which these entities may be alike or differ – e.g., the 
similar shape but different colour of two objects. Similarly 
with relations, or properties of ordered n-tuples of concrete 
particulars – e.g., the parent-child relation in which I stand 
to each of my children but in which none of them stands to 
me (Mellor and Oliver 1997, 1). In itself this 
characterization is not controversial. Nevertheless, it has 
given rise to an age-old debate concerning the question of 
how the similarities and differences embodied in properties 
should be accounted for. One basic answer to this 
question, which goes back to Plato, is what has 
traditionally been called realism (Loux 1998, Chap. 1). On 
this view properties are a special type of entities, 
universals, that differ from particulars in that they are 
repeatable – i.e. while no particular can have distinct 
occurences at the same time, numerically one and the 
same property can, realists maintain, be wholly and 
completely exhibited or, as they typically put it, exemplified 
simultaneously by several distinct particulars, or n-tuples of 
particulars, or even by other properties. According to 
realism then, particulars are similar or agree in attribute if 
and only if there is some one thing, a universal, which they 
literally share or have in common. And similarly with 
properties, and properties of properties, and so on without 
end.  
Realism’s traditional rival account, nominalism, 
denies the existence of universals, and acknowledges only 
the existence of particulars. Going back to Abelard, 
Ockham and perhaps even Aristotle, this account has two 
main variants. According to the first, extreme nominalism, 
concrete particulars exhaust the things that exist (Loux 
1978, 6-7; Loux 1998, 58-60). Therefore, the similarities 
and differences between them must be irreducibly primitive 
features of the world that cannot be explained in more 
basic terms. Likewise, talk about properties of properties 
should be construed in ways that do not presuppose 
anything above and beyond concrete particulars (Loux 
1998, 62-79). 
On the second main variant of nominalism, trope 
theory, properties, as well as properties of properties, 
should be accounted for in terms of a special type of 
particulars, tropes: Where concrete particulars agree in 
attribute, trope theorists maintain, it is because they have 
similar tropes (Loux 1998, 79-82). As particulars tropes are 
supposed to be nonrepeatable. But unlike their concrete 
kin, they are taken to be abstract in some sense (Mellor 
and Oliver 1997, 121-3 and 126), and the similarities and 
differences between them are considered irreducibly 
primitive features of the world (ibid. 169-70). 
  
3 Extreme nominalism conflicts with the Cartesian 
conception. For it implies that concrete particulars have no 
constituents of a more basic ontological status. But 
Cartesian minds are supposed to be ontologically 
structured in the sense of having such constituents. As will 
become clear below this difficulty may be relieved by 
slightly modifying the Cartesian conception. But as we 
shall also see, extreme nominalism raises another problem 
for the Cartesian conception, which resists this 
modification. 
Trope theory too clashes with the Cartesian 
conception. For it considers the particularity of tropes to be 
acquired through location (Mellor and Oliver 1997, 136), 
which implies that attribute agreement should be 
accounted for in terms of spatial things. But Cartesian 
minds are supposed to be completely non-spatial. 
Finally, realism does not sit very well with the 
notion of simplicity that the Cartesian conception assumes. 
For even on an Aristotelian version of realism that denies 
the possibility of there being uninstantiated universals 
(Loux 1998, 45-8), a property of a given Cartesian mind 
can exist independently of all other constituents of this 
mind – viz. as a property of a different mind. It may 
perhaps be possible to get around this problem by 
modifying the said notion of simplicity. But as I shall now 
show, realism raises another, insurmountable problem for 
the Cartesian conception.  
  
4 According to the principle of the identity of 
indiscernibles it is impossible for numerically different 
concrete particulars to share all their properties. Although 
this principle is trivially true under trope theory (Loux 1998, 
108), there are very strong reasons to consider it false 
under realism (Armstrong 1989, 64-70). This is therefore 
the majority view today as well as what I shall assume.     
Call the question of what it takes for concrete 
particulars of the same sort to be numerically identical or 
distinct, the individuation problem. My assumption 
concerning the falsity under realism of the principle of the 
identity of indiscernibles immediately entails that, given 
realism, numerical diversity cannot consist of the having of 
at least some different properties, nor can numerical 
identity consist of the having of exactly the same 
properties. Thus, this assumption entails that, given 
realism, an account of the ontological structure or 
constitution of concrete particulars cannot solve the 
individuation problem if it involves only properties. Are 
there then any accounts of this structure that involve more 




than properties, and can they solve the individuation 
problem?    
 
5 Of the three accounts of the ontological 
constitution of concrete particulars that contemporary 
metaphysicians hold to be exhaustive, one, bundle theory, 
involves only properties (Loux 1978, 112-115; Loux 1998, 
98-100). However, the two other accounts – bare 
substratum and characterized particulars - are less 
spartan. A basic idea of bare substratum theory is that the 
properties of concrete particulars must be supported by an 
entity, substratum, which is completely independent from 
them. Another basic idea is that the relation between a 
substratum and its properties – if there are such - must be 
the same as the relation between concrete particulars and 
their properties. This means that if a substratum has 
properties of its own, there must be another substratum 
that supports them, which will immediately set us off on an 
infinite regress. So yet another basic idea of this theory is 
that a substratum must be devoid of any properties of its 
own (Loux 1970, 235-44; Loux 1998, 93-8). 
The basic idea of a representative and particularly 
elaborated version of characterized particulars theory, 
namely substance theory, is that concrete particulars are 
instantiations of a special type of universals, kinds, that 
represent irreducibly unified ways of being (Loux 1970, 
193-195; Loux 1978, 158-166; Loux 1998, 117-127). This 
means, first, that a concrete particular’s belonging to a kind 
cannot be analyzed in terms of its possessing given 
properties. But secondly, it also means that a concrete 
particular can be construed as a genuine subject of the 
properties associated with it. Thirdly, it means that a 
subset of these properties that are determined by the kind 
to which the concrete particular belongs, expresses its 
core being or essence thereby enabling it to function as 
the possessor of all its other properties.  
 
6 Both bare substratum theory and substance 
theory hold that the bare substrata and kinds which they 
postulate respectively, make it possible to solve the 
individuation problem. Thus, according to bare substratum 
theory bare substrata are what endow concrete particulars 
with individuality, thereby rendering them distinct (Loux 
1970, 192 and 242). Similarly, substance theory takes the 
irreducible unity represented by kinds to be reflected in 
concrete particulars, qua instantiations of kinds, thereby 
rendering these instantiations distinct (Loux 1998, 121-
123). However, merely to postulate a sort of individuating 
entities is not yet to explain what it means for the things 
individuated by these entities to be identical or distinct. 
Ontological generosity, as Strawson most aptly put it, is no 
substitute for elucidation (1997, 38). Apart from this 
problem substance theory’s approach to the individuation 
problem entails that instantiations of kinds must be 
considered numerically diverse (Loux 1978, 161), which 
does not seem to cohere with the fact that qua universals 
kinds must have numerically identical instantiations. 
Moreover, other versions of characterized particulars 
theory (Loux 1998, 129), are not better off than substance 
theory with respect to the individuation problem. It follows 
that, given realism, a proper solution to the individuation 
problem requires some other ontological machinery. But 
what can this other machinery be? 
 
7 Going back to Avicenna and Duns Scotus, the 
first of what seems to be the only two possible answers to 
this question, is haecceity or thisness – i.e. a primitive 
feature of a particular, which that particular alone 
possesses and which nothing else could have had either 
instead of or as well as it. Obviously this solution to the 
individuation problem does not advance us beyond the 
solutions offered by bare substratum theory and bundle 
theory. For like the latter two the “thisness” solution does 
not specify in an informative way what it takes for concrete 
particulars to be the same or different. Indeed, all it says 
concerning this question is tantamount to the claim that 
there is some feature of concrete particulars in virtue of 
which such entities are identical or distinct. But then, short 
of explaining - as a proper solution to the individuation 
problem should - what it means for concrete particulars to 
be identical or distinct, the “thisness” account presupposes 
an understanding of what this means.  
The second possible answer to our question is, of 
course, a spatio-temporal position. A widely accepted view 
is that it is impossible for two distinct particulars to occupy 
precisely the same region of space at a given time. 
Consider, however, the possibility of, e.g., two objects that 
consist of distinct parts or particles, which mingle so that 
the parts/particles constituting the one fill the gaps 
between those constituting the other. Examples of this type 
show, I take it, that although the said view is not very wide 
of the mark, it requires some refinement or perhaps even  
reformulation in terms of spatio-temporal history (Hamlyn 
1984, 72-75). Nevertheless I will keep to the original 
formulation since it will simplify my discussion without 
significantly affecting its main points. 
If distinct particulars cannot occupy the same 
spatio-temporal position, then any such position is 
nonrepeatable – i.e. it cannot characterize more than one 
thing. Given realism, this means that spatio-temporal 
positions are not properties. But it also means that the 
spatio-temporal positions that particulars occupy can be 
considered as that which individuates them. This 
suggestion may be objected to on the grounds that given 
the widely accepted relational conception of space and 
time it is viciously circular: If spatio-temporal positions are 
determined by relations between distinct particulars they 
must apparently presuppose rather than explain numerical 
difference. However, this objection would be justified only if 
the relational conception of space and time requires that 
the individuation of spatio-temporal positions be separate 
from and posterior to the individuation of particulars. But 
insofar as the relational conception is concerned the 
individuation of spatio-temporal positions and that of 
concrete particulars may be intimately linked in much the 
same way as, e.g., the justification of specific deductive 
inferences and that of general logical rules are interrelated 
(Goodman 1983, 63-64) – i.e. each may require the other 
and be inseparable from it (Strawson 1959, 36-38). So the 
circularity objection is unsound. This rejoinder requires of 
course further elaboration. But even in its present, very 
sketchy form it is sufficient to block the main objection to 
the spatio-temporal account of individuation. 
 
8 Since incorporeal things like Cartesian minds are 
supposed to be non-spatial, it is impossible to apply to 
them directly the spatio-temporal account of individuation. 
However, this does not preclude the possibility of applying 
this account to Cartesian minds indirectly by way of some 
non-spatial relation in which they stand to corporeal 
objects like human bodies. As examples of such relations 
one can bring (1) a relation of uniform regularity between 
mental and bodily events, (2) a nomic (or lawful) 
connection between such events, (3) natural 
supervenience (Chalmers 1995, 34-38) of Cartesian minds 
on bodies. However, for reasons we already saw, it is – 
given realism - logically possible for there to be numerically 
distinct Cartesian minds that are qualitatively 




indistinguishable. This being the case, whatever the non-
spatial relation between a given Cartesian mind and a 
given body, it is logically possible that there are other 
Cartesian minds that stand in exactly the same relation to 
this very same body. In Strawson’s apt formulation 
“uniqueness of the body does not guarantee uniqueness of 
the Cartesian soul” (1959, 101). It follows that, given 
realism, it is impossible to apply the spatio-temporal 
account of individuation to Cartesian minds even indirectly. 
This being the case realism entails that no answer can be 
given to the question wherein the identity or diversity of 
Cartesian minds consists. But without an answer to this 
question the idea of Cartesian minds would not not really 
make sense. For such an answer is partially constitutive of 
the meaning of sortals like this idea (Lowe 1989, 24-5). 
Thus, realism renders the idea of Cartesian minds 
unintelligible. 
 
9 Unlike the supposed non-spatiality of Cartesian 
minds the fact that such minds are supposed to be 
ontologically structured is not a very central feature of the 
Cartesian conception. Thus, unlike the conflict between 
this conception and trope theory, which is due to the 
former feature, its clash with extreme nominalism, which is 
due to the latter feature, may be resolved by simply 
forgoing this very feature. However, such a course will not 
remedy the Cartesian conception. For extreme nominalism 
must allow for the possibility of there being distinct yet 
absolutely alike Cartesian minds. Otherwise it will have 
extremely implausible consequences – e.g., that distinct 
yet very similar minds, which it certainly must allow, merge 
into one mind when becoming, as they certainly can, 
absolutely alike. But then, problems analogous to those 
that realism faces with respect to the individuation of 
Cartesian minds, will also inflict extreme nominalism. And 
this means that this view as well renders the notion of 
Cartesian minds unintelligible. 
 
10 To sum up, then, the Cartesian conception 
must assume either nominalism or realism, since these 
ontological views are jointly exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive. However, if it assumes either extreme 
nominalism or trope theory it is incoherent. And if it 
assumes either extreme nominalism or realism it is 
unintelligible. Thus, the Cartesian conception is either 
incoherent or unintelligible or both.1 
 
 
                                                     
1 Many thanks to Dalia Drai, Jerome Gellman and Hami Verbin for thei helpful 
comments. 
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